Recent Reported Cases
Euro London Limited v Claessens [2006]
EWCA Civ 385. On instructions from Berkson & Berkson
of Birkenhead we persuaded the Court of Appeal in a
second tier appeal to distinguish between primary payment
obligation and a liquidated damages claim when a a payment obligation
was contingent on an event
which was also a breach
(i.e. loss of rebate for early termination under a
recruitment agency agreement due to non payment of
original invoice).
Evans v Cherry Tree Finance [2007] EWCA 3527 (Ch)
. On instructions from Chadwick Lawrence of
Huddersfield we persuaded a Chancery Judge that the
use of the Rule of 78 as a basis for a redemption
charge in non status consumer lending over a
substantial term contravened the Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1998 in that it was
opaque and unclear and failed to comply with the
requirements that the terms should be in plain,
intelligible language. and they required Mr Evans to
pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation
for early termination.
Evans v Cherry Tree Finance Limited [2008] EWCA Civ
331. On further instructions from Chadwick
Lawrence we fended off a collateral attack on the decision above
mentioned challenging the applicability of the
Regulations to a business man
making a commercial agreement outside his normal
business. The Court of Appeal held that Mr Evans was a consumer under the UTCC Regulations 1998
and that they applied to his mortgage despite the
premises having a commercial use.
Brandon v American Express [2011] EWCA Civ
1187. On
instructions from Trinity Law Solicitors of
Huddersfield we obtained permission to bring a
second appeal and persuaded the Court of Appeal that
time taken for posting should be allowed for when
considering the date of service of a default notice
and that the period specified between service
of a default notice and the 'remedy by' date of 14
days was neither discretionary, nor was failure to
provide it de minimis if payment had not been
effected within the period concerned. Further
an attempt by AMEX to change its case between the
first hearing and the first appeal without amendment
should not have been permitted and the issues ought
not to have been determined summarily either at
first instance or on the first appeal. |